

**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE**

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 16-605

28 MARCH 2012



Operations Support

**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE US-
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENTS**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at www.e-Publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication

OPR: AF/A5XP

Certified by: AF/A5X
(Russell J. Frasz, SES)

Supersedes: AFI16-605, 23 June 2009

Pages: 15

This publication provides instruction on the United States Air Force (USAF) implementation of and compliance with the US/International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) integrated safeguards agreements to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (consisting of comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol) in accordance with US law and policy, as specified in: Department of Defense (DOD) Directive (DODD) 2060.1, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*; DOD Instruction (DODI) 2060.03, *Application of the National Security Exclusion to the Agreements Between the USA and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US*; and Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 16-6, *International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, and the DOD Foreign Clearance Program*. It applies to all USAF organizations and offices including the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG). This AFI may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements must be routed to AF/A5XP for coordination prior to certification and approval. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to AF/A5XP using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Form 847s from the field through appropriate chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.mv.af.mil/afirms/afirms/afirms/rims.cfm>

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This Instruction is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. The previous version's publication preceded the entry into force of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement

between The United States of America and The International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. This revision modifies the language to reflect the Implementation Activities currently taking place for this agreement and eliminates responsibilities outlined solely for the preparation of its entry into force.

1. Overview.

1.1. Purpose.

1.1.1. The purpose of this instruction is to provide guidance for USAF implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States and the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States. These agreements are also known as the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol (AP) respectively, and are collectively referred to as the integrated safeguards agreements.

1.2. Background.

1.2.1. The *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, established a safeguards system directed by the IAEA. The NPT set the number of declared Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) at five (United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China). All other states are designated as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS).

1.2.2. Each NNWS is required to enter into a bilateral state-specific comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA to verify that nuclear materials from NNWS programs are not being diverted for weapons use.

1.2.3. As a NWS, the United States was not required to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, for transparency purposes and to promote the nation's broader nonproliferation policy goals, the United States concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980. The US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement is similar to NNWS agreements with the IAEA, with one important difference: the US agreement excludes facilities with national security significance from verification.

1.2.4. Following the Gulf War in 1991, inspections in Iraq revealed a clandestine nuclear program, despite Iraq's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As a result, the IAEA sought to strengthen bilateral safeguard agreements. These measures culminated in the Model Additional Protocol (IAEA INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) in 1997. As with the original comprehensive safeguards agreements, states negotiated bilateral Additional Protocols with the IAEA, using the Model Additional Protocol as the baseline.

1.2.5. The Model AP expands IAEA rights to verify that States Parties are not diverting nuclear material for weapons programs by requiring:

1.2.5.1. Declaration of facilities involved in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle from mining through final assembly.

1.2.5.2. Complementary access allowing inspection of undeclared locations.

1.2.5.3. Environmental sampling beyond declared locations when deemed necessary.

1.2.5.4. Enhanced monitoring capabilities through the use of advanced technology and information analysis.

1.2.6. Under the Model AP, IAEA inspectors are allowed access to all declared facilities. In addition, the AP complementary access provision allows for access to undeclared locations with very short notice, ranging from 2 to 24 hours. In exceptional circumstances, the IAEA may provide less than 2 hours notice. The purpose of complementary access inspections is to ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and/or activities. Complementary access requests must be in writing and must specify the reasons for access and the activities to be carried out during such access.

1.2.7. The United States concluded its voluntary bilateral AP with the IAEA on 12 June 1998. The US AP includes all provisions of the Model Additional Protocol, but adds the National Security Exclusion (NSE) to protect its national security interests. The NSE is a mechanism giving the United States the right to exclude IAEA inspector access to programs, facilities, or information of “direct national security significance.”

1.2.8. On 31 March 2004, the US Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the AP subject to several conditions. These included the development of necessary regulations and guidance for the use of NSE and managed access; performing necessary security vulnerability assessments identifying location, activities and information of direct national security significance; and conducting necessary security and counterintelligence training. After the completion of these actions, the AP entered into force on 6 January 2009.

1.2.9. In addition to the NSE, the United States has the right under the AP to employ managed access to protect activities or information during the course of IAEA inspections. The AP does not specify what measures may be employed. Rather, each location must develop its own managed access with guidance from appropriate security personnel and AF/A5XP. Managed access may include, but is not limited to:

1.2.9.1. Removing sensitive papers from office spaces;

1.2.9.2. Shrouding sensitive displays and equipment;

1.2.9.3. Logging off from computers and turning off data indication devices;

1.2.9.4. Dismissing non-essential personnel during the inspection period.

1.2.10. All DOD-owned installations and defense-funded research and development, technologies and materials, military capabilities, equipment, and operations, including intelligence activities are considered to be of direct national security significance and therefore are excluded from the declaration list and subject to a NSE. Should DOD determine it wishes to grant access on a case-by-case basis, the DOD will implement managed access.

1.3. Implementation Guidance.

1.3.1. *National Security Presidential Directive 57 on the Implementation of the US-IAEA Additional Protocol*, dated 4 Feb 2008 (SECRET) and Presidential Executive Order 13458, 4 Feb 2008, titled *Implementation of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement*

Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, provide guidance to all USG Departments and Agencies concerning implementation of the US integrated safeguards with the IAEA.

1.3.2. DOD Directive (DODD) 2060.1, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements* requires the Heads of the DOD components to implement, within their organizations, US national policy under those arms control treaties and agreements to which the United States is a Party. The Secretary of the Air Force delegates central authority to Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements (AF/A3/5) for all USAF implementation and compliance activities in AFPD 16-6, *International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements*, and the *DOD Foreign Clearance Program*. Existing USAF chains of command are sufficient for communication and execution of matters relating to integrated safeguards.

1.3.3. DOD Instruction (DODI) 2060.03, *Application of the National Security Exclusion to the Agreements between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America*, provides further guidance to DOD components on the application of the NSE.

1.3.4. AFI 63-101, *Acquisition and Sustainment Life Cycle Management*, states that USAF program managers are responsible for ensuring that all activities within the acquisition cycle are compliant with all USG arms control obligations. In addition, program managers are responsible for protecting national security and sensitive information regarding their programs through existing program protection plans (PPPs).

1.3.5. AFI 16-601, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements*, gives the directive requirements for implementing and complying with arms control agreements and designates AF/A3/5 as the USAF central authority for arms control agreements. The Strategic Plans and Policy Division (AF/A5XP) is designated the Treaty Implementation Manager for all aspects of the USAF arms control process.

2. Responsibilities.

2.1. Overall Responsibilities.

2.1.1. All USAF programs and activities must be fully compliant with all arms control agreements of the US Government; the integrated safeguards will be no exception.

2.1.2. All USAF organizations must be aware of USAF obligations to fulfill US commitments to implement and comply with all arms control treaties and agreements, to include the integrated safeguards. The USAF is responsible for ensuring the proper protection of national security information from unauthorized disclosure during arms control visits under any treaty or agreement.

2.1.3. AF/A5XP is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the integrated safeguards and will oversee all MAJCOMs, relevant Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) and equivalent units, Air Force District of Washington (AFDW) and the Air National Guard (ANG) implementation plans and activities.

2.1.4. All MAJCOMs, relevant NAFs and equivalent units, AFDW and the ANG will be responsible for ensuring that subordinate units implement this instruction.

2.2. Specific Responsibilities.

2.2.1. AF/A5XP shall:

2.2.1.1. Act as the USAF point of contact concerning issues of implementation and compliance with the integrated safeguard agreements.

2.2.1.2. Coordinate with Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff concerning all matters associated with the integrated safeguards, working in close coordination with Offices of the Secretary of the Air Force to include: Special Programs (SAF/AQL), the Director of Security, Counterintelligence and Special Programs (SAF/AAZ) and the General Counsel (SAF/GC).

2.2.1.3. Act as the USAF interface with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in accordance with DODI 5205.10, *DoD Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP)*.

2.2.1.4. Ensure that USAF provides timely and adequate support for IAEA visits to the United States, as requested by the DOD Host Team representatives participating in the inspection management.

2.2.1.5. Coordinate with the DOD Treaty Manager in the vetting process of all IAEA inspectors and technicians, if requested.

2.2.1.6. Participate in DOD-level meetings and discussions regarding guidance for integrated safeguard implementation and compliance.

2.2.1.7. Conduct outreach/liaison within DOD and with the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Commerce (DOC), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to ensure USAF equities are incorporated into integrated safeguards planning.

2.2.1.8. In coordination with the MAJCOMS, develop and lead processes for USAF actions to identify and protect USAF equities of national security significance that may be at risk of exposure under the integrated safeguards.

2.2.1.9. Provide awareness training and subject matter expertise. Ensure required security and counterintelligence training concerning the integrated safeguards and their impact on USAF programs and activities is developed by the appropriate USAF organizations and provided to affected USAF organizations and commands, as necessary.

2.2.2. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) shall:

2.2.2.1. Ensure *Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement* (DFARS) clause 252.204-7010 titled, "Requirement for Contractor to Notify DoD if the Contractor's Activities are Subject to Reporting under the U.S.-International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol" is included in all contracts as prescribed by DFARS 204.470-3, Contract Clause.

2.2.2.2. Ensure program managers of USAF equities that could be affected by integrated safeguards are aware of the integrated safeguards' provisions, US

obligations under the agreements, the rights of the United States to protect national security information during inspections, and the DOD and USAF policies concerning the application of NSE to DoD activities and equities.

2.2.2.3. Inform AF/A5XP of any national security concerns or other sensitive requirements regarding implementation of the integrated safeguards by other USG departments or organizations as they impact USAF acquisitions.

2.2.2.4. Inform AF/A5XP of any requests by the IAEA for a complementary access visit to USAF activities, equities, programs or facilities related to acquisition of USAF capabilities, to include subcontractor activities supporting acquisitions, in order to assist the DOD representative on the USG Host Team in determining whether to seek a NSE or permit managed access to the location.

2.2.3. The Office of the Director of Security, Counterintelligence and Special Programs (SAF/AAZ) shall conduct a separate analysis of declarations provided by the DOE, DOC, and NRC to determine security implications of any complementary access visits upon any USAF acquisitions programs, operations at logistics centers, or special programs.

2.2.3.1. SAF/AAZ will notify AF/A5XP and seek assistance in determining whether to seek a NSE or permit managed access prior to IAEA visits to these locations.

2.2.3.2. SAF/AAZ will take separate actions, as it determines necessary through appropriate channels, to seek application of NSEs or managed access should it determine USAF equities, activities, or interests are at risk.

2.2.4. Air Force General Counsel (SAF/GC) shall provide legal support to the Air Force's implementation of the US-IAEA integrated safeguards agreements.

2.2.5. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) shall:

2.2.5.1. Provide integrated safeguards-related counterintelligence support, to include counterintelligence training to Air Force offices upon request.

2.2.5.2. Provide direct support to AF/A5XP, as necessary, during any vetting of inspectors requested by DOD.

2.2.5.3. Provide direct support to AF/A5XP and SAF/AAZ concerning counterintelligence matters as requested during any IAEA complementary access visits to the United States.

2.2.6. MAJCOMs shall:

2.2.6.1. Assess the impact of integrated safeguards upon their commands and/or programs, when requested, or when they determine that environmental changes necessitate an assessment. This assessment must be conducted regardless of whether the activity is nuclear or non-nuclear in nature and regardless of the physical proximity to declared locations.

2.2.6.2. Ensure the proper application of NSE in accordance with DODI 2060.03 and act proactively to ensure personnel know and understand the DOD policy to exempt national security activities from any complementary access visits. If commands believe their activities and/or programs may be included in a declaration by the United States, they should raise the issue to AF/A5XP for consideration.

2.2.6.3. Recognizing that declared activities by the DOE, DOC, and the NRC may create security vulnerabilities for USAF operations or activities located *at* or *near* these declarations, ensure timely notification of such risks through the appropriate chain of command. The USAF has defined the term *at* as an equity physically located at the declared location. The USAF has defined *near* to mean an equity located within ten miles of the declared location or having a business relationship (regardless of physical proximity) with the declared location.

2.2.6.4. Determine the level of exposure to command assets *at* or *near* declared facilities eligible for IAEA inspections and ensure adequate plans are in place to mitigate the risk. Should the command and/or program determine it is at some level of risk, it will develop managed access plans in coordination with the lead government agency for the declared site. MAJCOMs will also predetermine as accurately as possible, when NSE will be sought during inspections.

2.2.6.5. Coordinate with USAF program managers to ensure that plans, programs, and budgets are implemented in compliance with integrated safeguards, while safeguarding sensitive national security information. If there are USAF activities being conducted under contract with a commercial entity, the program manager for that equity must know when to insist on preventing access or implementing managed access. Review PPPs as requested.

2.2.6.6. Develop notional plans, if applicable, outlining when NSE will be sought during unplanned/unknown requests for complementary access to locations that are not exclusively on the declarations of eligible facilities for inspection.

2.2.6.7. Inform AF/A5XP of a point of contact for integrated safeguards matters and ensure AF/A5XP is notified of changes in points of contact within 30 days.

3. Implementation Activities.

3.1. Data Collection.

3.1.1. As directed by DOD and the Joint Staff, AF/A5XP will facilitate data calls to review/assess proposed declarations lists generated by other USG agencies, including any updates to the Eligible Facilities List (EFL) and determine potential USAF impacts for routine and complementary access inspections. Data calls will entail dissemination of proposed declarations provided by DOE, DOC, and the NRC to the appropriate MAJCOMs and organizations.

3.1.2. AF/A5XP will lead USAF efforts in identifying USAF facilities, programs, activities, and equities located *at* or *near* declared facilities.

3.1.3. AF/A5XP will make a determination regarding any sites, facilities or activities that should be removed from the declaration list or be subject to an NSE. AF/A5XP will ensure compliance with DODI 2060.03 and coordinate the gathering of data and supporting information necessary to seek NSEs. The USAF's final determination will be reported to the Joint Staff and the OSD treaty manager.

3.2. Security Vulnerability Assessments.

3.2.1. USAF equity stakeholders will conduct the necessary security vulnerability assessments (SVAs) of sites, facilities or activities identified in a data call as vulnerable

to exposure during AP visits. This assessment may be performed by the stakeholder unit's leadership in coordination with security personnel. Conducting an SVA involves identifying USAF equities that could be compromised during international inspections and rating the threat level to each equity.

3.2.2. Program managers are required by AFI 63-101 to ensure all activities within the acquisition cycle are compliant with all USG arms control obligations and if necessary prepare PPPs to ensure their programs are protected.

3.2.3. If local units and/or program managers believe they need additional SVA support beyond the scope of what is available at their level, they are encouraged to request it from AF/A5XP through intermediate headquarters. AF/A5XP will seek assistance from policy, treaty and security experts from the Office of the Director of Security, Counterintelligence and Special Programs (SAF/AAZ), Directorate of Special Investigations (SAF/IGX), Information Protection Directorate (SAF/AAP), Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and other subject matter experts as needed.

3.3. Air Force Integrated Safeguards Equity Database.

3.3.1. AF/A5XP will develop and maintain an internal electronic database of USAF equities based on input from the MAJCOMs and Headquarters Air Force.

3.3.2. The USAF database will contain information gathered during initial, annual, and other data calls. The database will contain a description of the USAF program or activity, its geographic location, contact information (i.e. program manager or commander), and results of security vulnerability assessments.

3.4. Inspections and Complementary Access Visits.

3.4.1. The IAEA will be provided access to inspect declared locations. In accordance with the integrated safeguards, IAEA inspectors will also have the right to request complementary access to undeclared locations either *at*, or *near* the declared location.

3.4.2. In the event of a complementary access request to an undeclared location, USAF equities and activities of national security significance may be inadvertently exposed to IAEA. These types of visits may be requested with short notice, from 2 to 24 hours depending upon the specific circumstances of the request. In exceptional circumstances, the IAEA may provide less than 2 hours notice. This provision in the AP is designed to permit inspectors to "follow the trail" of nuclear material diversion from legitimate activities to possibly illegitimate activities. Because of the short notice, ordinary security provisions for DOD equities and activities may not be adequate to protect national security information.

3.4.3. The US government will employ an interagency host team process to monitor and manage the risks associated with IAEA inspections, whether these are pre-notified or short-notice requests for complementary access to undeclared locations. The DOD will have a representative on the host team, and the USAF will be required to support the DOD representative with technical advice concerning USAF equities and activities *at* or *near* the visited site derived from the USAF Integrated Safeguards Equity Database.

3.5. Notification and Command and Control.

3.5.1. The USAF operations cell, situated within the National Military Command Center, will serve as the 24-hour point of contact for receiving formal notifications from DOD. Notifications received by the USAF operations cell will be relayed to AF/A5XP via email to APResponseCell@pentagon.af.mil (searchable in the Global Access List as “AP Response Cell”).

3.5.2. AF/A5XP will be the central office for the USAF to receive notifications of visits by the IAEA. AF/A5XP will ensure notifications are passed to affected units and organizations.

3.5.3. AF/A5XP will disseminate notifications and other messages associated with the integrated safeguards via email to designated points of contact with follow-up voice notification to points of contact.

3.6. Outreach and Awareness Training.

3.6.1. In accordance with AFI 16-603, *Education and Training Requirements for Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*, AF/A5XP will:

3.6.1.1. Develop an integrated safeguards training and awareness program for USAF personnel, activities, and programs affected by the agreements so that informed decisions can be made regarding implementation and compliance with the integrated safeguards, while protecting sensitive or national security information.

3.6.1.2. Provide managed access training. Managed access for the AP will be similar to the procedures discussed in section 1.2.9.

3.6.1.3. Provide AP general awareness training as a section of instruction within the USAF annual arms control course.

3.6.1.4. Will represent the USAF in all OSD-sponsored AP exercises and/or mock inspections. MAJCOM and select treaty compliance points of contact and program managers may also participate in such activities on request.

3.7. Staff Assistance.

3.7.1. AF/A5XP will:

3.7.1.1. Provide assistance to MAJCOMs and program managers in the development and implementation of compliance plans, SVAs, managed access, or any other integrated safeguards-related issues, when requested.

3.7.1.2. Provide assistance to project managers and contractors subject to DFARS Clause 252.204-7010 in developing PPPs in accordance with AFI 63-101.

4. Funding.

4.1. General.

4.1.1. Funding for USAF US-IAEA integrated safeguards implementation and compliance will be provided by AF/A5XP. MAJCOMs will budget accordingly for the AP within their annual plans they provide to AF/A5XP.

HERBERT J. CARLISLE, Lt Gen, USAF
DCS, Operations, Plans & Requirements

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), entered into force 5 Mar 70

Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, entered into force 9 Dec 80

Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, signed 12 Jun 98, entered into force 6 Jan 09

INFCIRC 540, *Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of the Safeguards*, September 1997

Subsidiary Arrangement to the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, 12 Jul 98

Executive Report 108-12, *Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill letter to the Director General of the IAEA expressing the United States' interpretation of Additional Protocol provisions*, written 30 Apr 02

United States Department of State, *Article-by-Article Analysis of the US-IAEA Additional Protocol*

Senate Resolution of Ratification, Treaty Document 107-7 [Page: S3511], *Protocol to the Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Safeguards in the United States, with 2 Conditions and 8 Understandings*, 31 Mar 04

Public Law 109-401, Title II, *United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act*, signed 18 Dec 06

Executive Order 13458, *Implementation of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America*, signed 4 Feb 08

National Security Presidential Directive 57 on the Implementation of the US-IAEA Additional Protocol, signed 4 Feb 08 (SECRET)

DODD 2060.1, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*, 9 Jan 01

DODI 2060.03, *Application of the National Security Exclusion to the Agreements Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America*, 13 Nov 08

DODD 5205.07, *Special Access Program (SAP) Policy*, 1 Jul 10

DODI 5205.10, *DoD Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP)*, 20 Feb 09

DODI O-5205.11, *Management, Administration, and Oversight of DoD Special Access Programs (SAPs)*, 1 Jul 97

DODI 5200.08, *Security of DoD Installations and Resources, and the DoD Physical Security Review Board (PSRB)*, 10 Dec 05 (incorporating Change 1, 19 May 2010)

DOD 5200.1-R, *DoD Information Security Program*, 14 Jan 97

DODD 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*, 16 Jun 92

DODD 5230.25, *Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public Disclosure*, 6 Nov 84, Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Change 1, 18 Aug 95

DODI 5200.39, *Critical Program Information (CPI) Protection within the DoD*, 16 Jul 08 (incorporating Change 1, 28 December 2010)

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations System (DFARS), *US-International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol*, Case 2004 D003, 18 Aug 08

AFPD 16-6, *International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, and the DOD Foreign Clearance Program*, 29 Dec 2010

AFI 16-601, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements*, 18 Feb 11

AFI 16-603, *Education and Training Requirements for Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*, 9 Jun 11

AFI 63-101, *Acquisition and Sustainment Life Cycle Management*, 17 Apr 09 (incorporating through Change 4, 3 Aug 11)

AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 Mar 08

Adopted Forms

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

Terms

Additional Protocol (AP)— Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. IAEA INFCIRC/288.Add.1.

Air Force Equities— Refers to all nuclear and non-nuclear USAF facilities, sites, programs and activities conducted by the USAF or contracted by the USAF.

“At or near”— Treaty term that refers to the proximity (or relative position, space, or time) of activities, locations, or information associated with a defense equity that would enable its characterization. The terms are not defined in the AP. The USAF has defined the term “at” as equities physically located at the declared location. The USAF has defined “near” to mean equities within ten miles of the declared location or having a business relationship (regardless of physical proximity) with the declared location.

Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP)— A Department of Defense organization constituted to assist customers in preparing their organization for inspections and/or complementary access visits.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)— DTRA's mission includes combat support, technology development, threat control, and threat reduction. Under Integrated Safeguards, DTRA will likely have responsibilities pertaining to technical equipment inspections (TEI), inspection equipment storage and transfer, and inspection notification.

Department of Commerce (DOC)— A Lead Agency for integrated safeguards in the US, DOC, via its Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), will be responsible for integrated safeguards implementation as it applies to any commercial activity not licensed by the NRC, including uranium mining, research and development not involving nuclear materials, and manufacturing and importing exports of specially designed nuclear equipment.

Department of Energy (DOE)— A Lead Agency for integrated safeguards in the US, DOE will be responsible for reporting and protecting all eligible programs and activities at its national laboratories and other locations.

Facility— A reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, isotope separation plant, separate storage installation, or any location capable of making more than 1 kilogram of nuclear materiel suitable for a nuclear device.

IAEA Complementary Access Visit or Inspection— Access provided by the US to IAEA inspectors in accordance with the provisions of the US Additional Protocol (AP). Access can be requested on short notice, within 2 to 24 hours of the requested visit. The IAEA shall have complementary access for three purposes: to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at sites, mines, concentration plants and other locations where nuclear material has been declared; to resolve a question on the correctness or completeness of the information provided by the US pursuant Article 2 of the AP, or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information; and to confirm, for safeguard purposes, the declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or a location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.

INFCIRC— IAEA Information Circular – The primary means whereby the IAEA publishes documents, including agreement texts.

Information associated with activities of direct national security significance— Pertains to any unclassified or classified information (including data, text, drawings, or graphics) that is communicated or recorded in any form (including hardcopy, electronic or softcopy, verbal, or as imagery, signals, or materials) related to national security or homeland defense, including: military operations or training; intelligence; materiel production, maintenance, or supply; research, development, test, or evaluation; infrastructure or personnel.

Information Circular 153— INFCIRC/153 is the Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Non-Nuclear Weapons States party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are required to submit to a comprehensive safeguards program and sign an individual agreement with the IAEA based on INFCIRC 153. It is designed to verify declared nuclear materials and activities.

Information Circular 540— INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), also referred to as the Model Additional Protocol, is the model for all Additional Protocol agreements signed by countries and the IAEA. INFCIRC 540 was designed to enhance the original safeguards agreements and includes measures to enable the IAEA to provide greater assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.

Integrated Safeguards— Refers to the combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve the maximum effectiveness in safeguarding nuclear materials and verifying a country's compliance with the agreements.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)— The IAEA is the world's center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was established as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies, and to enforce nuclear safeguards agreements.

Locations associated with activities of direct national security significance— Pertains to any DoD-owned, -leased, -funded, or -used space, structure, facility, installation, or land occupied by, or associated, with national security or homeland defense, including: military operations or training; intelligence; materiel production, maintenance, or supply; research, development, test, or evaluation; infrastructure or personnel.

Location outside facilities— Any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

Managed Access— Measures that restrict inspector access to certain spaces or activities to avoid compromise of national security, proprietary or other sensitive information.

National Security Exclusion (NSE)— The unilateral right of the US to exclude the IAEA from access to activities of direct national security significance, or to locations or information associated with such activities.

Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS)— Per the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), any state other than the five designated Nuclear Weapon States (NWS); NNWSs are required by the NPT to forego the development and/or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)— It entered into force in 1970 and aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide. The Treaty prohibits NWS from assisting NNWS in acquiring nuclear weapons. NNWS are afforded opportunities to use nuclear technologies/materials for civil purposes, but must subject these materials and the associated activities to IAEA safeguards.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)— A Lead Agency for integrated safeguards in the US. The NRC will have the lead role for commercial activities that it licenses (e.g., reactors, uranium mills, infrastructure supporting facilities, and equipment exports).

Nuclear Weapon State (NWS)— Any state which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. Based on these criteria, the NWS are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVAs)— The analysis of threats from potential arms control inspector visits to determine the susceptibility and vulnerability of Air Force equities. Conducting SVAs involves identifying USAF equities that could be compromised during international inspections and rating them as high, medium, or low risk.

Site— A more narrowly defined term than "facility" that refers to the specific area within a facility/location where IAEA inspectors are allowed to conduct an inspection. If the inspectors wish to go beyond the demarcated boundary of the site, a complementary access must be

requested in accordance with the Additional Protocol provisions. Examples of a site include, but are not limited to, a room, storage vault, or specific building.

US Additional Protocol Declaration— Refers to a list of those civilian nuclear or nuclear-related activities disclosed by the US to the IAEA for verification, pursuant to Article 2 of the US-IAEA Additional Protocol. The IAEA may request complementary access to verify the completeness or correctness of the declaration.

US Eligible Facilities List (EFL)— The list is confidential and contains specific information (i.e. building numbers, maps, etc.) regarding where the IAEA inspectors have been permitted to conduct inspections in the past. In accordance with Article 1 (b) of the US-IAEA Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement, EFL refers to “a list of facilities within the United States that are not associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States...” Since the inception of the 1980 voluntary agreement, the United States has made more than 300 facilities eligible for IAEA selection for the implementation of safeguards. The current list contains over 250 facilities, most of which are NRC licensees.

US-IAEA Additional Protocol— The AP was signed by the United States on 12 June 1998 and the US Senate provided advice and consent to ratification on 31 March 2004. The AP entered into force on 6 January 2009. The US-IAEA AP was based on the Model Additional Protocol, which was aimed at providing greater assurance to the IAEA that nuclear materials are not diverted for illegal purposes. Unlike the Model Additional Protocol, the US-IAEA agreement includes a national security exclusion clause in Article 1 which allows the United States to preclude, without justification, the application of IAEA safeguard measures to materials, activities, and facilities of direct national security significance. In addition, the AP allows the right to use managed access to protect activities or information of national security significance during the course of IAEA inspections.

US-IAEA Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement / INFCIRC 288— It was signed by the United States and the IAEA on 18 November 1977 and the US Senate provided advice and consent to ratification on 2 July 1980. President Carter ratified the Agreement on 31 July 1980 and it entered into force on 9 December 1980. INFCIRC 288 requires the United States to declare only commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors, and fuel fabrication plants as eligible for safeguards. Under this agreement, IAEA inspectors regularly visit four US nuclear facilities to verify records of nuclear material in storage, to check and maintain IAEA-installed instruments and surveillance equipment, and to confirm physical inventories of nuclear material. The USG reserves the right to add or remove facilities, at any time and for any reason, from the eligible facilities list (EFL), but is required to notify the IAEA when it does so.

US Lead Agencies— Those Executive Departments or Agencies designated as having jurisdiction over locations of declarable activities and/or national security equities as well as responsibility for implementation of the AP’s requirements to provide information or declarations to the IAEA and/or provide complementary access. The Lead Agencies are the Departments of Energy, Defense, Commerce and State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.